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The Master's Tools v. The Master's House: Creative Commons v.
Copyright
Séverine Dusollier'
As a project leader for Creative Commons in Belgium, some might expect me to
strongly promote this project, which bas gained major importance in the "copyleft"
movement.1 Nevertheless, even though 1 welcome the birth and development of
Creative Commons for open content licensing, 1 do DOt recommend its use in all
contexts. The aim of the Creative Commons licenses is, broad1y, to authorize the
use of copyrighted works for purposes that would constitute infringement under
traditional copyright law, thereby fostering wider use of creative content. My
experiences in dealing with these licenses, in discussing the advantages and
limitations of them with artists and creators, and in observing the significant public
success to-date of the Creative Commons project and the powerful marketing
forces behind it, have caused me to thoroughly analyze this licensing regime,
including its consequences for artistic creation and the legal protection of creators.
This Article, which is the result of that reflection, explores some unintended,
potential effects of the Creative Commons licensing regime on culture and creation,
due to the project's somewhat ambiguous ideology and its hidden agenda. The
origin of the Creative Commons project can be found in the growing body of
criticism directed against the current copyright regime. For perhaps the fust rime
in the history of copyright, this criticism of the copyright regime is being voiced as
much by the general public, by the users of protected works and by at least some
legal scholars.2 Responding to these criticisms, the objective of Creative
* Associate prof essor at the University of Namur (Belgium), Jean Monnet Fellow at the European
University Institute of Florence (Italy). The author wishes to thank Professor Jane C. Ginsburg for ber
attentive reading and valuable suggestions, as weIl as Niva Elkin-Koren, Dirk De Wit, Nicolas Malevé,
Laurence Rassel and the participants of the A TRIP Conference that took place in Montreal in July 2005
and where this article was presented and discussed.
1. "Copyleft" is the terni that is now commonly used to designate the free software or free art
initiatives. Those movements have coined the ternI copyleft in opposition to copyright to emphasize that
contrary to a traditional exercise of the copyright, the author in copyleft gives up ber right in the work
and leaves it to the public. Actually, the copyright is not properly given up or left to the public, but the
author authorizes a broader right to use her work than what is traditionally granted.
2. See also Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 354 (1999); James Boyle, The Second Enclosure
Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 LAw CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 (2003); Bernt
Hugenholtz, Copyright. Contract and Technology -What Wil, remain of the Public Domain?, in
COPYRIGHT: A RIGHT TO CONTROL ACCESS TO WORKS? (Séverine Dusollier ed., 2000); Julie Cohen,
Information Rights and Intellectual Freedom, in ETHICS AND THE INTERNET II (Anton Vedder ed.,
2001); THE COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION (Neil Netanel & Niva Elkin-Koren eds., 2002);
LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF lDEAS -THE FATE OF THE COMMONS lN A CONNECTED WORLD
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Commons is twofold. First, it primarily aims to counteract the increasing
protection of creative content by copyright. This aim considers the recent
expansion of copyright with respect to the abject, the duration and the scope of
protection to be overreaching and detrirnental bath for future creators and for the
users of copyrighted works. ln order to reduce what Creative Commons' founders
perceive as an unfair copyright monopoly, they advocate a new model for
disseminating creative content that promotes free access to and use of creative
content. This new model thereby seeks to transmit a vast number of creative works
into the "commons." The ultimate objective of Creative Commons is to place
creative works into resources that will make them freely available to the general
public. Second, instead of trying to reduce the appetites of greedy rights holders3
and overzealous lawmakers, Creative Commons seeks to cure a symbolic failure of
the present copyright regime. This failure is marked by the increasing perception
of copyright as an impediment to the creative process or the enjoyment of cultural
resources, rather than as a necessary element of the creative process and access to
artistic culture.
ln attempting to respond to bath perceived problems with the copyright regirne,
the strategy of the Creative Commons project bas been to develop a licensing
model that, instead of prohibiting the use of copyrighted works (the "all-rights-
reserved" approach), purports to authorize the reproduction and dissemination of
works, while also allowing the licensor to prohibit unwanted uses ofher works (the
"some-rights-reserved" approach). The strategy for this project bas bath a legal
and a symbolic component. The legal component is the licensing model itself,
which comprises a range of licenses available to creators who want to share their
works under the Creative Commons regime. The symbolic component, which is no
less important, consists of promoting among creators the philosophy of sharing and
contributing to the commons. This marketing campaign encourages creators and
artists to adhere to a new model of copyright by distributing and sharing their
works with the public for free.
This Article aims first to analyze the s1rategy that Creative Commons bas
unfolded in order to 1ransform the copyright regime and then to consider critically
the relationship between the objectives it pursues (i.e., to curtail cdpyright's
overreach and to build up an extensive collection of works of culture and
knowledge in the commons) and the means it deploys (i.e., the licensing scheme
and the promotion of a free culture).
Audre Lorde, a black feminist writer, poet and activist, wrote that "the master's
tools will never dismantle the master's house.,,4 Lorde's quotation serves as a
metaphor for my analysis of the relationship between the goals of Creative
Commons and the tools it uses. For the Creative Commons founders and
5. lt i
tthe copyrig
the purpose
(2001).
3. See Jane C. Ginsburg, How Copyright Got a Bad Name/or ltse?!; 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 61,
61 (2002).
4. AUDRE LoRDE, The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House, in SISTER
OUTSIDER, 110, 112 (1984).
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supporters, the "master's house" is the copyright regime or, rather, the copyright
regime as it bas become in recent yeaTS, a regime where copyrighted works have
become increasingly commodified and where the access to and use of such works
bas been increasingly controlled.
1 personally agree with the Creative Commons perspective that the dramatically
expanded power of copyright is a worthy enemy to combat. Contemporary
copyright unduly govems access to and enjoyment of works in an unprecedented
way. Armed with restrictive contracts, restraining technological measures and
excessive influence on policymakers, copyright holders have managed in the last
twenty yeaTs to effectively transform the public and social protections of copyright
into an impenetrable fortress where any use of a work can be controlled, inhibited
or purchased. This Article aims to analyze the strategy that Creative Commons bas
executed to assault he copyright fortress and the potential effects. of fuis strategy
on artistic creation.s
This Article does not seek to discredit Creative Commons; rather, it endeavors
to provide a fair analysis of Creative Commons that identifies the potential defects
and risks of the model. ln my view, Creative Commons is a useful invention in the
copyright world because it off ers practical and user-friendly tools that reinvent the
exercise of copyright, as the open source licenses did for software. Nevertheless,
the ambiguity of Creative Commons' strategy and discourse might adversely affect
artistic creation, to an extent that is surely not intended by the its staff and its
promoters around the world. To be really meaningful, any political movement (and
Creative Commons is one) should consider the strategy it espouses as much as the
end it pursues. This concem does not slow clown the process or the political action
it sets into motion; rather, it helps to counteract possible criticisms that might
undermine the very objective of the action.
After examining the strategy and tools of Creative Commons, Part 1 will explore
the ambiguous relationship between the tools that Creative Commons uses and the
agenda that it seeks to achieve. Part II will explore the strategy of having recourse
to licensing mechanisms. Part ru will acknowledge the subversive effect that fuis
strategy might have on some key principles of copyright, such as the notion of the
author. Finally, Part IV will describe the COTe agenda of Creative Commons (i.e.,
the desire for a free culture based upon the expectations of users) and will
demonstrate to what extent such an ultimate goal might reinforce some of the
current excesses in copyright to the detriment of the aUthors themselves.
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5. It is not clear whether the CreativeCommons initiative seeks only to eliminate the excesses in
the copyright regime or if its ultirnate objective is ta dispose of copyright altogether. 1 will assume that
the purpose of the Creative Commons project is the former and not the latter.
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1. THE STRATEGY AND TOOLS OF CREATIVE COMMONS
A. ORIGIN AND STRATEGY
~
Creative Commons is a non-profit, U.S.-based organization that provides
licensing tools to creators who want to exercise their copyright rights in the non-
traditional way that encourages haring and creative re-use of intellectual works.6
Founded in 2001, Creative Commons owes its origin to Lawrence Lessig, a well-
known scholar in cyberspace law. Ris writings criticize the growing capability of
copyright owners to exert power over their work, through law, contract or
technological measures, and to prohibit any use thereof.7 ln 11Ie Future of Ideas,
Lessig sketches a proposaI that promotes the transformation of copyrighted works
roto the commons, i.e., roto content that can be used by the public and potential
future creators.8 From this, the idea ofCreative Commons was homo
The main purpose of Creative Commons parallels that of the free software
movement which seeks to use copyright to authorize, rather than inhibit, copying,
distribution, modification and re-use of software and other copyrighted works.
Moreover, Creative Commons and open source software projects, such as the
General Public License (GPL) initiative, share a common strategy: they do not
want to abolish copyright, as some have argued, or require copyright owners to
relinquish their rights and dedicate their works to the public domain (save for one
peculiar license the system provides).9 Instead, both Creative Commons licenses
and the GPL software license assert copyright in the specific works or software at
issue. Therefore, the Creative Commons licensing regime clearly rests upon the
proprietary regime of copyright, but seeks to exercise it differently. Indeed,
Creative Commons provides tools, i.e., licenses that enshrine the desire to freely
distribute and share creative content.
source move
program no ,
Even thougb
less the sam
distribute fuI
obliged to pt
obliged to (
software sbe
model tbrou
free softwarl
Creative
author a chc
user. WheIJ
choose whe
wants to lin
to oblige tlJ
work and
Creative C,
author wbel
The ranI
from:ll
-The At.
the origina
does not ha
it is commt
-The A
original au
distribute t
Any use, v
is closest 1
limitation
feature to 1
-The .
mention tI
purposes.
-The A
previous l
Creative (
-The A
B. THE LEGAL TOOLS: THE CREATIVE COMMONS LICENSES
As in open source or free software, the Creative Commons licenses purport to
give some basic freedoms to the licensees. These include the right to reproduce,
communicate or distribute the work to the public for free. From that point on,
Creative Commons departs from the licensing system established by the open
10. Se
L.J. 1125, 1
PROF. L.J. 3
Il. Fc
Creative Cc
Feb. Il,20<
6. See Creative Commons Home Page, http://creativecommons.org (Iast visited Feb. Il,2006).
7. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND ÜTHER LAws OF CYBERSPACE 122-41 (1999); LAWRENCE
LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF lDEAS -THE FATE OF mE COMMONS lN A CONNECTED WORLD 177-200 (2001)
[hereinafter LESSIG, FREE CULTURE]; LAWRENCE LES SIG, FREE CULTURE -How BIG MEDIA USES
TEcHNOLOGY AND mE LAW TO LocK DoWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATJVJTY 183-200 (2004)
[hereinafter LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF lDEAS].
8. LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF lDEAS, supra note 7, at 249-61. See also LESSIG, FREE CULTURE,
supra note 8, at 273-305 (discussing fuis model in more detail).
9. Creative Commons also offers a Public Domain Dedication License that enables an author to
give up ber copyright in a work completely and dedicate that work to the public domain. The legality of
this license-that is, whether an author can relinquish her copyright in a work she created-is not clear
in some countries.
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source movement. The open source movement provided the author of a software
program no choice regarding the license under which she could distribute ber work.
Even though free/open source licenses are now numerous, they all convey more or
legs the same rights and obligations. Besides the basic rights to reproduce and
distribute the work, the user bas a right to modify the software and the licensor is
obliged to provide the user with the source code of the program. The user is in turn
obliged to distribute, under the same licensing regime, the modifications to the
software she made. The goal of such a mIe is to gradually spread the open source
model throughout the computer environment. This is known as the viral effect of
free software. '0
Creative Commons differs from the open source model inasmuch as it gives an
author a choice between different licenses each of which grants diverse rights to the
user. When deciding to license ber work under Creative Commons, an author can
choose whether she will allow the work to be modified by the user, whether she
wants to limit uses of ber work to non-commercial purposes and whether she wants
to oblige the user to grant the same freedom of use when the latter modifies the
work and publicly communicates the derivative work. Regardless of which
Creative Commons license the author chooses, a work should be attributed to its
author when it is disseminated.
The range of choices results in six different licenses for the author to choose
from:"
-The Attribution License: Under this license, the user must mention the name of
the original author and is entitled to modify the work. Once modified, the work
does not have to be licensed under a Creative Commons scheme. Any use, whether
it is commercial or non-commercial, is authorized.
-The Attribution Share Alike License: The user must mention the name of the
original author when disseminating the work and may modify the work, but must
distribute the derivative work under the same licensing terms as the original work.
Any use, whether it is commercial or non-commercial, is authorized. This license
is closest to the GPL or any copyleft license in free software because there is no
limitation on non-commercial uses and the "share alike" provision gives a viral
feature to the license.
-The Attribution Non-commercial License: ln addition to the obligation to
mention the name of the author, the user cannot use the work for commercial
purposes. She can, however, modify the work.
-The Attribution Non-commercial Share Alike License: This is the same as the
previous license except that any derivative work bas to be licensed under the same
Creative Commons license.
-The Attribution No Derivative Works License: The user must mention the name
SSIG, FREE CULTURE,
III
tenables an author to
.main. The legality of
: created-is Dot clear
10. See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Humans, Computers and Binding Commitment, 75 IND.
L.J. 1125, 1132 (2000); Christian Nadan, Open Source Licensing: Virus or Virtue?, 10 TEx. INTELL.
PRoP. L.J. 349, 350 (2001-2002) (discussing the viral effect offree software).
Il. For the list of these licenses, basic infonnation about each and links to more infonnation, sec
Creative Commons Licenses, http://creativecommons.orgiabout/licenseslmeet-the-licenses (last visited
Feb. Il,2006).
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of the author and is not entitled to make derivative works from the licensed work.
However, the user may copy and distribute the work for commercial and non-
commercial pUIposes.
-77ze Attribution Non-commercial No Derivative WorksLicense: This license is
the most restrictive. the author's name must be mentioned, the work must not be
modified, and the work may be used only for non-commercial pUIposes.
Creative Commons bas also gradually developed other specific licenses
available for particular types of works as weIl as licenses that help authors
relinquish their rights over their works, release them into the public domain or
reduce the term of protection oftheir works.12 Those licenses will not be discussed
here because they are used legs frequently and some mise specific issues not related
to this Article.
Once the author bas chosen between the six basic licenses, ber choice is
translated into a license that appears in three forms. The tirst is called the Legal
Code. The Legal Code is a lengthy contract with numerous detailed provisions
setting forth the rights and obligations of the parties. This is also the license that
can be legally enforced. If the user wishes to do gO, she can access the Legal Code
license.13 However, normally the tirst thing a user will encounter when planning to
use a Creative Commons work will be what the Creative Commons jargon clubs the
"Commons Deeds" or the "Human-Readable License." This is a simple one-page
text summarizing the basic freedoms and obligations that the license corners on the
user. The most interesting feature devised by the Creative Commons system
appears here. Symbols visualize the basic rights granted by the license, which help
the user (due to the success of the Creative Commons project and its iconography)
to immediately recognize the type of license goveming the distribution of the work.
Here are the symbols used by Creative Commons:
e Attribution
@) Non Commercial
e No Derivative Works
@ ShareAlike
14. CIe
12006). !
15. Ont .\
similarity bet 1
translation of
can sometimf 1
licenses. SOI ~
adapt the liCf
generic liceru
lissue that sho
revision of th
one jurisdictic
spirit.
12. See generally Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication License,
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/publicdornain/ (Iast visited Feb. II, 2006) (Iicense by which a
copyright owner relinquishes ber rights and dedicates a work to the public dornain); Founder's
Copyright License, http://creativecommons.org/projectslfounderscopyrightl (last visited Feb. II, 2006)
(license by which an author adopts a shorter terrn of fourteen yeaTS for the protection of ber wOrk, after
which the work enters the public dornain); Share Music License, http://creativecommons.org/
license/music (last visited Feb. II, 2006) (license customized for the sharing of digital music); the
Developing Nations License, http://creativecommons.org/licensesldevnationS/2.0negalcode (last visited
Feb. II, 2006) (license granting more rights to Developing Nations); Sample Licenses,
http://creativecommons.org/aboutlsampling (last visited Feb. II, 2006) (three different licenses specific
to the sampling ofmusic).
13. As a principle, the user should read the Legal Code that constitutes the whole contract binding
ber to the copyright holder. Otherwise, she might be deerned DOt to have consented to the contract,
unless one considers the Commons Deeds and symbols to have a sufficient value by themselves to bind
the user, or unless, because they refer to the Legal Code and enable the user to read it, the Commons
Deeds and symbols suffice to effectuate the Legal Code as included in the terms the user bas agreed
upon. The legal validity of such a mechanism will vary from one jurisdiction to another.
~
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For example, a work disseminated under a Attribution, Non Commercial, Share
Alike license will bear the following icons: 8@@.
The last form of the licenses is technical. The so-called "Digital Code" provides
the necessary digital elements to affix the license to the work when the works is
distributed online. Search engines programmed to search for Creative Commons
content can then trace these technical elements.
The author can also select which jurisdiction' s law will govem the chosen
license. Even though the project originated in the United States, Creative
Commons bas tried to adapt its licensing system to other nations' regulatory
frameworks. For that purpose, the organization asked national teams to translate
the licenses into their languages and legal systems. Works can DOW be licensed
under Creative Commons licenses that are customized to the laws and languages of
more than twenty countries.14 As the Creative Commons team monitors and
checks the transfer of licenses into nationallaws, aIl of these licenses are designed
to be compatible both with the generic licenses and with each other, and to give the
SaIne rights and obligations to the parties. Compared to most open source licenses,
the Creative Commons licenses probably are more easily accepted by authors and
users because they can understand the licenses' language and can rely on the
licenses' compliance with their nationallaw.1S
The key features of the licenses are as follows: each license grants a worldwide,
royalty-free, non-exclusive, perpetual license to the user to reproduce, display,
perform, communicate and to distribute copies of the work. Depending on the type
of the selected license, the right to create derivative works or to use the work for
commercial purposes might also be granted. AlI rights DOt expressly granted by the
licensor are reserved, with the exception of limitations to copyright that are DOt
prejudiced by the license. This re~ults from a provision of the Creative Commons
licenses. The licensee must include a copy of the license with every copy of the
work that she distributes. She must also keep intact aIl notices and the disclaimer
of warranties included in the license, credit the original and subsequent authors of
the work, and DOt impose any additional terms on the work's license or apply
digital rights management systems that alter or restrict the terms of the license or
the rights of subsequent licensees. Share-Alike licenses require that the furtheredication License,
(license by which a
dornain); Founder's
'isited Feb, Il,2006)
ion ofher work, after
:reativecommons.org/)f digital music); the
egalcode (last visited
Sample Licenses,
:rent licenses specific
14. Creative Commons Worldwide, http://creativecommons.org/worldwide/ (last visited Feb. II,
2006).
15. One should note, however, that either this cross-border legal cornpliance or the global
sirnilarity between national versions might be a wishful thinking on sorne points. As the process of
translation of the licenses into nationallaws bas shawn, national peculiarities of the copyright regime
can sornetirnes require an adaptation to the license that would disropt the worldwide similarity of the
licenses. Sornetimes, for the sake of that similarity, the Creative Cornmons team bas decided Dot to
adapt the license but to envisage the problern raised in one jurisdiction in the future revision of the
generic license itself. For instance, the difficulty of licensing moral rights in Borne jurisdictions is an
issue that should be taken into consideration in a further version of the licenses. At other rimes, a minor
revision of the license bas been validated to rnake the license cornply with the regulatory framework of
one jurisdiction, even though it made that license slightly different to the generic one, in letter if DOt in
spirit.
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distribution of derivative works is made under the same license tenDs.
The license also provides that the work is offered as-is, with no warranties of
any kind, and that the licensor disclaims allliability. Not only is the license said to
be perpetua! (in other words, existing for the duration of the applicable copyright),
but it is also irrevocable, except when a breach of contract occurs. That
irrevocability does Dot prevent the licensor from releasing ber work under different
licensing tenDS or from ceasing to distribute ber work at any time. However,
should the author change ber mind and decide to distribute ber work under other
tenDs, this would Dot terminate the Creative Commons licenses that she had already
entered into or undermine the effects of such existing licenses.
Il
l f ! "
l'IIl, i 1
C. THE SYMBOLIC TOOLS OF CREATIVE COMMONS: THE Emos OF SHARING
A work licensed under the Creative Commons regime does not belong to the
public domain. On the contrary, any Creative Commons license asserts the
copyright in the work. The user bas no rights to use the work other than those
granted by the license and those from which she benefits according to local law
(e.g., fair use or other limitations on copyright). Creative Commons thus plays the
game of copyright and does not attempt to abolish it. At the same time, the birth of
the Creative Commons project resulted from a critical view of the copyright regime
and what it bas become, particularly in the digital environment. The Creative
Commons project is one of the voices and initiatives that denounces the increasing
enclosure of the public domain and the commodification of information that an
extensive use of contract or digital rights management and an ongoing extension of
copyright scope and term of protection are perceived to have enabled}6 ln order to
counteract such increasing power over creative content, the strategy of Creative
Commons is to use contracts to give new meaning to the exercise of copyright.
Unlike many proprietary licenses, these licenses do not entail a prohibition or a
strictly defmed limited right to use the work, but instead grant to the public a broad
freedom to use, reproduce, communicate and sometimes modify the work.
Subsequent creators can build upon the existing content to make their own
creations. For example, users can enjoy the work, make copies and send them to
friends. Teachers can refer to educational material and re-use it for their own
classes, and information can be shared and transmitted online.
Contract bas thus become a tool for fostering the sharing and re-use of literary
and artistic works and for helping users, particularly subsequent creators, access
creative content. Rather than reserving all rights to the work except those granted
by licenses (usually for par), the licensing tools used by Creative Commons grant
many freedoms to the users of works, but reserve some rights when the author so
wishes. The final objective of Creative Commons is to enhance collaboration
among creators so that an extensive repository of content becomes available for aIl
to build upon, thus "promoting an ethos of sharing, public education, and creative
17. N
1Creative Co 18. TI
Particularly
fair use or c16. See Ginsburg, supra note 3.
~
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The Creative Commons' agenda focuses on empowering individual authors who
wish to participate actively in the creative process and to share their works with
subsequent creators and the public, even though such sharing implies that users will
employ the work in ways that would normally infringe copyright. These creators
might be artists who do DOt want to apply a copyright system they consider
excessive and constraining to their creation, they might be non-profit organizations
who se purpose is to share publicly the information or content they produce, or they
might be teachers who aliow other teachers to benefit from the courses and
educational tools they develop.
Motivations for recourse to Creative Commons licenses are diverse. Some are
strongly anti-copyright, others simply corne from the desire to find a practical way
to exercise copyright to share and authorize the use of the work and stili others
corne from a wish to benefit from the success of Creative Commons in making
their works known to a broader public. The Creative Commons projects 1 have
seen are also diverse. A network of non-profit radios bas used Creative Commons
licenses to share its broadcasts; a researcher bas put a search engine and practical
tips for research she developed for students on a website under a Creative
Commons license; an association giving information about women and the
Information Technology industry bas produced a newsletter under a Creative
Commons license; video games around the theme of anti-globalization are
available on-line under a Creative Commons license; and an artist bas collected
recordings of the comments of people visiting a contemporary art exhibition andprovided them to the public under a Creative Commons license. .
Many creators who license their works under the Creative Commons regime
believe that copyright impedes the dissemination of knowledge. They feel that
their only choice is between "aIl rights reserved" and "no protection at aIl."IS To
these authors, Creative Commons provides an intermediary solution: rights are
protected, but sharing and re-use is promoted. If the author wishes, the license can
also prohibit other people from using ber works for a commercial purpose, thereby
preventing others from deriving remuneration from ber creation. That model fits
with most of the desires of at least some individual creators, particularly of those
who create content outside of the arts (namely, researchers, teachers and non-profit
providers of information), who create works DOt for the sake of remuneration (they
are usually remunerated in other ways), but for the purpose of sharing their
creations with their peers or to be recognized by a larger audience for what they
have produced.
One should DOt forget that copyright grants diverse rights to authorize or
prohibit some detined uses. Copyright is DOt, as it is sometimes perceived, about
17. Niva Elkin-Koren, Whot Contracts Can't Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in Facilitating a
Creative Gommons, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 375, 388 (2005).
18. This impression is somewhat false: copyright is also a "some-rights-reserved scheme,"
particularly if one considers that copyright is limited in its scope and some uses are authorized through
fair use or compuJsory Jicensing regimes.
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making money off of a creative work and prohibiting or authorizing use only in
return for a remuneration. Copyright is primarily a right that enables creators to
control what can be done with their creations. This control can entail a request for
remuneration for any use of a work, a prohibition of a proposed use even if
remuneration is offered, or a consent o many uses of the work for free. Between
these two poles, the complete prohibition or the free use, there is a whole range of
possible controls that the author can exert. The very purpose of copyright is
precisely to offer that choice to the author, thereby giving ber some control over
what she bas created.The copyright industry bas developed many tools to exercise the prohibitive part
of copyright. License contracts are mostly drafted to arrange the authorization of a
restricted use in return for remuneration. Some rights are administered by
collecting societies so that the authors are in a stronger position to enforce the
prohibition on use or to negotiate the financial conditions for some use; technology
is DOW intervening to enforce the rights that have been defmed by the copyright
owners and paid for by the users.Many authors who did Dot want to enter into such prohibitive contracts and
wanted others to use their works freely had the impression that no practical or legal
tool was available to help them frame such sharing. The general role in copyright
is that every use covered by a right owned by the copyright holder is DOt allowed
without an authorization from the copyright holder.19 Therefore, publishing a work
on the intemet does DOt mean peT se that downloading or copying it is allowed in
the absence of clear authorization from the right holder. Users who know a little
about copyright law might be reluctant to reproduce such a work without being
assured that the copyright owner will allow it. Informed users might also wish to
know the exact scope of the authorization. As Niva Elkin-Koren bas accurately
explained, fuis reluctance and legal uncertainty could have a chilling effect on
users, despite the willingness of the author to spread the work under non-
prohibitive terms.20 To be (legally) effective, the desire to offer the work to the
public should be enshrined in a copyright notice or a license making such
authorization legally secure. That would imply, for the copyright owner, entering
into a process that could be costly. The presence of the transaction costs of
figuring out how to write terms and conditions is at odds with the will to give the
work away for free.Creative Commons' development, following other copyleft or open source
initiatives, of tools that effectively exercise the right to authorize should,
accordingly, be celebrated. The range of practical ways for the author to exercise
ber copyright previously lacked widespread and uniform mechanisms for granting
authorization. Creative Commons organizes authors' ability to authorize free use of
their works by offering an author-friendly and user-friendly licensing platform. ln
other words, it aims to reduce the costs of licensing and getting copyright
21. la
22. T
their contrit
have been t
source wor
economy 0
and make aExcept in the case of a compulsory license where the use of the work is authorized by law.
Elkin-Koren, supra note 17, at 380.
19.
20.
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clearance.21 The significant public success of Creative Commons and the presence
of the logos conveying the extent of the authorization have made those licenses
very recognizable and usable by authors and users; this also helps reduce the cost
oflicensing.
By addressing the authorization aspect of the copyright monopoly, as no one bas
previously done so efficiently, Creative Commons stars in line with copyright law.
Rather than eluding copyright, Creative Commons incorporates one essential part
of the property right over creative content into legal and enforceable tools. ln that
sense, Creative Commons does Dot dismantle copyright' s bouse. It merely
renovates a part of the bouse that was legs frequently used in recent years and was
almost left abandoned.
This ethos of sharing suggests that the economic model put in place by the
Creative Commons licenses is one of gratuity. With the extent of free use
depending on the type of license the author bas chosen, users of works are Dot
asked to par for some basic uses of copyrighted works. This system seems to turn
on its head the traditional economic model of copyright where the remuneration
that flows from the exercise of exclusive rights is deemed to be the necessary
incentive to create. But other benefits resulting from the release of a work under
Creative Commons licenses might also incentivize creation. The tirst one is the
reputation that might result from a broad dissemination of a work. We have
aIready witnessed a similar process in open source software, where programmers
can make a reputation out of participating in the incremental programming of a
piece of software. ln some cultural sectors, where the reputation of an artist is
helped by the circulation of ber works, such as in contemporary visual art, the use
of the Creative Commons system might increase the circulation of the work and
thUg bring ber fame. Distributing works for free might provide artists with new
opportunities, such as funding, production contracts or paid contracts to work on
other projects.22
ln addition, the free distribution of works under a Creative Commons license
does Dot prevent the author from distributing them commercially on the side or
from licensing ber works to a publisher or a producer. The free use granted to users
by the license is Dot exclusive of other uses or licenses that the author might grant
to ber works. However, one should Dot be naïve: the existing circulation of the
work for free under a Creative Commons scheme reduces the commercial interest
in the work. By using a "non-commercial" Creative Commons license, the author
can retain the possibility of offering ber creation to a commercial publisher or
producer. But the latter might doubt the ability to make money off of a work that is
available for free on the internet or anywhere else. Because the Creative Commons
1\ or open source
1 authorize should,
author to exercise
trisms for granting
1 thorize free use of
!lSing platfoml. ln
Igetting copyright 21. Id. at 381-83.
22. This is often the case in the open source software environment where developers, known for
their contributions to open source software, have been asked to provide paid training or consultation or
have been hired by important computer companies. This bas created an economy of services in the open
source world that bas somewhat replaced the economy of selling goods (software). Should such an
economy of services emerge in the artistic environment, it would adversely affect the way artists work
and make a living and would ment further analysis.
[29:3COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS 2006]282
is privatizeo
information
coupled wi.
contract SOI
Commons
regulate.
ln arec
Commonst
license is said to be non-revocable and perpetual, the author may be able to stop
distributing ber work under that license and opt out of the Creative Commons
regime at any time she wishes, but she will Dot be able to stop anyone who bas
obtained the work under this license from using the work or making copies thereof,
nor will she be able to withdraw any copies of the work from circulation if those
are duly authorized by the existing Creative Commons license.
ln sum, if the interest pursued by the creator is the hope for remuneration, the
Creative Commons scheme is Dot very helpful. However, many creators are Dot as
interested in being paid for wbat they create, because they might receive
remuneration from another source or because their primary purpose in creation
might Dot be remuneration. Those whose primary reason for creation is Dot
remuneration might include the teachers, scientists, non-governmental
organizations or even artists in some cases, such as those mentioned above. For
those persons, the "free" feature of the Creative Commons regime might Dot be an
obstacle in their decision to opt for such licenses.
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The tool upon which Creative Commons relies to promote the sharing and
spread of creative content is very well-known in copyright: the license. It is by
contract that a Creative Commons author consents to give away some rights to use
ber work.
Such reliance upon contract could prove to be the Achilles' heels of Creative
Commons' strategy. ln recent yeaTS, contract bas been considered by many to be
gradually transforming copyright into an expansive monopoly over cultural and
informational goods.23 By contract, copyright owners sometimes impose provisions
that purport to override copyright, such as clauses that prohibit or regulate the
exercise of copyright exceptions or fair use as to the work or limit the fust-sale
doctrine. Contracts can also serve to bind users to Dot reproduce or disseminate
some content that might Dot be protected by copyright, such as a non-original
database24 or mere information, thug limiting access to those resources. This
contractual regulation of the use of content, which is sometimes buttressed by
technical means, bas been dubbed "private ordering" by some scholars. Private
ordering operates when "the rule-making process regarding the use of information
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25. Niva Elkin-Koren, A Public-Regarding Approach to Contracting over Copyrights, in
EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF lNTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 192 (R.C. Dreyfuss, D. L. Zimmennan &
H. First eds., 2001).
26. Elkin-Koren, supra note 17, at 398.
27. See the preamble to any Creative Commons license. Such a mIe might be questionable in
some jurisdictions where the mere use of a licensed work does not suffice to consider that the
contracting party bas consented to the contractual terms of the license. However, this rule also appears
in the GPL license in open source software and has been enforced by some courts. See Landgericht
München (Apr. 5, 2004), available at http://www.intemet"observatory.be/internet_observatory/pdf/
legislation/jur/jur_de_2004-04-05.pdf(recognizing implicitly the enforceability of the GPL License).
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wrap contracts. Ironically, however, it is also the model adopted by open source
software and DOW by the Creative Commons.
AIready in the context of the open source movement, the software industry,
despite its apparent animosity to open source, was happy to witness the recourse to
the viral character of contract (particularly the provision that gays that each use of
the software amounts to a consent o the license terms y8 because it also use viral
contracts in its proprietary distribution of software and hoped that the enforceability
of such an excessive mIe would be recognized by the courts. Open source software
used the very mechanism that made the distribution of software so pervasive
(namely, the immediate application of a license as soon as the computer program
has been used).
Consequently, one can say that the viral contract is DOt the privilege of the
copyleft movement and can be detined as occurring "when a digital product bas
digital terms integrated with it, and the product-plus-terms propagates down a chain
of distribution, with the intent that the terms be binding on whoever cornes into
possession of the package.,,29 Such a definition would satisfy Microsoft, the Free
Software Foundation, the music industry selling music online and Creative
Commons. It enables the sale of a product or a service while simultaneously
binding a user under constraining or generous terms of use.
Margaret Radin wrote about this new form of contract, which she calls the
"contract-as-product" because "the terms are part of the product, DOt a conceptually
separate bargain; [the] physical product plus [the] terms are a package deal.,,3o
This is a new area of contract law that bas been implemented in adhesion contracts,
click-wrap contracts, machine-made contracts and viral contracts. ln the viral
contracts, the terms of the contract accompany the work or software that is
disseminated, the contract runs with the digital asset and the license is embedded in
the abject it purports to regulate. This is particularly true in Creative Commons
where the process of creating the license whose basic terms have been chosen by
the author is completely automated and a digital code version of the license is
provided to be affixed to the work. The product of the license is offered with the
product of the work.
The contract-as-product view makes the contractual rights closer to property
rights to the extent that this model eludes the consent of the contracting party. The
contractual rights almost become rights against the world. It also increases the
commodification of copyrighted works, as any copy of the work is govemed by
28. See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, How Copyleft Uses License Rights to Succeed in the Open
Source Software Revolution and the Implications/or Article 2B, 36 Hous. L. REv. 179 (1999).
29. Margaret Jane Radin, Information Tangibility, in EcONOMICS, LAW AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: SEEKING STRATEGŒS FOR RESEARCH AND TEACHING lN A DEVELOPING FIELD 395, 414
(Ove Granstrand ed., 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3S7060.
30. Radin, supra note 10, at 1126. She opposes the contract-as-product model and instead favors
the c~ntract-as-consent model where the parties expressly consent to the terms that will govern the
product or service covered by the contract. ln this traditional model of contract formation, there should
be a meeting of the minds and a possibility of bargaining. See also Margaret Jane Radin, Incomplete
Commodification in the Computerized World, in THE COMMODIFICAnON OF INFoRMAnoN 3 (N.W.
Netanel & N. E1kin-Koren eds. 2002).
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d by open source predetermined terms that apply to any use of the work. Yet, this is precisely that
growing commodification of copyrighted works that Creative Commons seeks to
fight. Elkin-Koren warns about this unintended consequence of the licensing
model put in place by Creative Commons and other copyleft initiatives thusly:
"The sarne roles that would make Creative Commons licenses enforceable would
equally make enforceable corporate licensing practices which override user' s
privileges under copyright law.,,31 It is ironie: who would have thoUght that
copyright industries could gain something from the copyleft movement? It further
suggests that not only will the master's tools never dismantle the master's house,
but the tools will arguably reinforce the solidity ofthat house.
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Despite this preliminary critique of the strategy of Creative Cornmons, could
there still be place for subversion within that strategy? Might the use of the tools of
copyright have a parody function that would ultimately shift both the meaning of
such tools and the entire construction? The use of licenses in copyright does Dot
aim to constrain the enjoyment ofworks, but rather aims to enlarge the freedoms of
the user. Such a subversive use will, at least according to the claim of the Creative
Commons' founders, change the social practices related to the spread of creative
content and the meaning of copyright.
One should Dot underestimate the subversive effect of re-enacting copyright for
achieving another purpose. Exercising copyright differently from what bas become
the usual, and almost normative, way might prove that the control/remuneration
rhetoric that tends to dominate the copyright discourse of today is in fact Dot
natura! but rather cornes from constructed habits, due to the copyright industry's
efforts. If that rhetoric is revealed as merely one choice, the imperative of making
copyright an increasingly stronger instrument of control may weIl be undermined.
Such a discovery could re-signify the meaning of copyright. The subversive
strategy of Creative Commons would then be successful.
There is Jet another subversive effect of Creative Commons. Creative
Commons focuses on individual creators and aims to empower them to distribute
their works under the terms they choose. It thus "reinstates the foie of individual
authors in the production of creative works.,,32 ln recent years, copyright
legislation bas privileged the economic interests of the content industry. Some
scholars have even claimed that the author's right (droit d'auteur) bas become a
right without authors (sans auteur).33 ln the Creative Commons scheme, the author
bas a central position: she retains ber rights and decides what will be done with ber
oser to property
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31. Elkin-Koren, supra note 17,at417.
32. Id. at 386.
33. See, e.g., Bernard Edelman, Reflections on copyright and the direction it is taking in the
European Community, XXVII COPYRlGHf BULLETIN, 10, Il n.4 (1993); Sam Ricketson, The 1992
Horace S. Manges Lecture -People or Machines: The Berne Convention and the Changing Concept of
Authorship, 16 COLUM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTS 1,28 (1991).
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work, with no intennediary to dictate a certain type of exploitation. This is one of
the reasons why many artists seem to be flattered by the Creative Commons
project: it appears to give back to them their long-lost autonomy in detennining the
life of their creation. ln that sense, Creative" Commons gives shape to a copyright
that is an author's right; this action should be acclaimed.
Nonetheless, the new rote of the author under Creative Commons also differs
from the traditional position of the author in copyright law, and it may, to some
extent, undermine the author' s relationship to ber work. ln a previous article, l
wrote that the figure of the author in the open source and Creative Commons
movements is no longer that of the romantic author traditionally associated with
copyright, but rather is closer to the post-modem author described by Barthes or
Foucault.34 Foucault used the terminology of the "founder of discursivity,"
referring thereby to those creators who initiate by their works a discursive practice
that sets in motion a number of possible applications in a chain of creation.35 The
initial work gives other creators the opportunity to pursue the creative process.
By the same token, Creative Commons aims to make creative works freely
available to the public, particularly to creators who desire to build their own
creations or derivative products upon existing works. Through sharing the work
equally between the author and the public, Creative Comm<>ns reinstates a
discursive and interactive practice in copyright. Without restrictions imposed by
the author or the copyright owner, users can play with the works.36 The figure of
the author bas lost its dominant position as the sole source of the meaning of the
artistic creation.
ln copyleft. mechanisms generally {which Creative Commons' licenses only
fully qualify as when they aIlow for the making of derivative works),37 the
allocation of power granted by copyright thug shifts from the author aIone to the
future creators who will build upon the primary work if the original author permits
them to do go. Consequently, Creative Commons, like other copyleft. initiatives, is
changing one key room in the copyright bouse. Should the authors follow the
primary ideology of Creative Commons, which seeks to promote the broadest kind
of sharing, and permit their works to be adapted and built upon, then the sense and
function of the author, which is one crucial feature of the copyright regime, may
weIl be modified. That modification of the author's rote would ultimately shift. the
meaning of copyright.
i~ i
34. Séverine Dusollier, Open source and Copyleft: Authorship Reconsidered?, 26 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 281 (2003).
35. Michel Foucault, What is an Author?, in TEXTUAL STRATEGŒS: PERSPEcnVES lN POST-
STRUCTURALIST CRITICISM 141, 154 (Josue Harari ed., 1979).
36. As Jane Ginsburg accurately pointed out to me, this Jack of constraint will be limited when the
author chooses to not aIlow the creation of derivative works under one of the No Derivative Works
Creative Commons licenses. The feature of an enhanced discursivity between the author and the public
is then lost, and the author continues to be perceived as the sole source ofmeaning for ber work.
37. Id.
38.
Rights in ,
des Mines
39.
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The empowering cole that Creative Commons seems to return to the author
should, however, be somewhat qualified. The agenda of Creative Commons is to
encourage people to adopt its view and ideology. As in any social and political
movement, Creative Commons bas developed a rhetorical strategy to urge creative
people to spread their creations for free. As in the case of the Free Software
Foundation, there is certainly a militancy in the movement. Creative Commons
does Dot espouse merely the development of an optional alternative licensing
regime; it views the "commons" as "a princip le, a religion or a morality, and it is
intended to be cumulative, to expand.,,38 ln Free Culture, Lawrence Lessig
endeavors to convince people that bis view of sharing copyrighted works is the
only ethically possible way of exercising copyright.39
However, Lessig's discourse is Dot really rooted in artistic practice either. Free
Culture purports to advocate giving copyright back to creators and thUg letting
them exercise copyright in a more reasonable way. Of the many chapters that
compose bis book, however, Creators is the title of only the first one. This chapter
addresses only the difficulty that creators might have in clearing copyright in the
works of others that they want to use in their own creation. ln other words,
consistent with a post-modernist view of artistic creation, it mainly considers
creators as users of existing works. This is an important issue. Clearing rights to
use pre-existing material bas become increasingly difficult in part because
copyright owners, flush with the power of their expanded copyrights, may
unreasonably refuse permission. Lessig, however, does Dot present any reason why
the artists should favor a Creative Commons system except that they sometimes
build upon the works of others.
On the other band, Free Culture spends thirteen chapters developing users'
needs for a copyright regime that would allow them to freely access and use
creative content. The book does Dot simply contend for some free access to works;
rather, it depicts a copyright law that gradually and unfairly encircles access to
works in general. Reading between the lines, the book appears to object to the fact
that copyright law entitles authors to prevent others to reproduce or communicate
their works or to make derivative works. Ultimately, Lessig advocates for totally
free competition, meaning that users should get free access to as many works as
possible and should be entitled to reproduce and distribute creative content. He is
Dot concerned about creators; rallier, he wants free access to free culture. This
mission is, of course, Dot consonant with the objective of copyright, which aims
both to protect creators and to enhance public access to artistic works.
The licensingsystem of Creative Commons mirrors Free Culture's objectives,
?, 26 COLUM. J.L. &
SPECTlVES lN PoST-
be limited when the
0 Derivative Works
uthor and the public
)r ber work.
38. Milton Mueller, Info-communism? A Critique of the Emerging Discourse of the Property
Rights in Information, Address at Govemance. Regulations and Power on the Internet Workshop, Ecole
des Mines, Paris, 21 (May 27, 2005) (transcript on file with the author; proceedings to bé published).
39. LESSIG,FREECULTURE,supranote7.
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including another post-modern idea. Even though Creative Cornmons claims to
empower the creators to decide what they want to do with their works, a closer
examination of the ideology of Creative Cornmons reveals that it is about
empowering users to get free (unconstrained and unpaid) access to works. It thus
illustrates the post-modern idea of consumerism, which is that access to
cornmodities should be easy and unencumbered by legal barriers.
By grounding the justification for a Creative Cornmons license in the
expectations of the users rather than in the desires of the creators, the agenda of
Creative Cornmons is to make the norm of free access to works the norm of a free
culture, the politically correct way for a creator to exercise ber rights. This is a
fundamental ambiguity ofCreative Cornmons ideology.
ThOUgh it might DOt fit perfectly, 1 would analogize this to domestic work.
Women, whether wives, mothers, daughters or sisters usually do their family's
domestic work. Growing gender equality and an increase in the number of women
working outside of the bouse have DOt changed that in a significant way. Domestic
work is needed for the smooth operation of a society and the beneficiaries of the
work demand it. Children have to be fed and dressed when arriving at school;
husbands need to have their shirts properly ironed and so forth. The need for these
services bas been used to justif).' why women, who culturally and socially have
been charged with the responsibility for doing this type of work, have historically
been required to perform the services for free. The rationale is that sharing such
work and giving it to the cornmunity benefits the architecture of society and
prevents society from making other choices. Such free work is also praised in
public discourse and bas become a social value. That ideology of a free gift does
DOt ake into account he foIe that society bas constructed for women. 1 do DOt want
to say definitively that bouse work should be paid, this being a very complex
debate, but 1 do want to highlight how the needs of the users have obscured the
reality, visibility and valorization of this work and have constructed the work as a
normal and natural thing for women to do, barring all retlection about what an
alternative system could be.
The same process is at work in Creative Cornmons, which mainly insists on the
needs of the users, be they further creators, industries wanting to exploit works, or
create derivative works or end-users. Creative Cornmons justifies a new model of
copyright by the hindrances those users encounter in accessing works. Yet, one
cannot see how Creative Cornmons could overcome the reluctance of Disney,
Microsoft or the RIAA to license their works for free or under reasonable
conditions, save for a change in social practice that would ultimately lead to a
legislative copyright reform. ln the meantime, the effort to be reasonable and
generous is requested from individual creators whose free gift to the demanding
users is considered the normal thing.
This analogy shows that the narrative of a gift economy is never devoid of social
and cultural construct and imperative. Resting the legitimacy of copyright only
upon the needs of the users of copyrighted works may socially and culturally
construct artistic creation in a very different and detrimental way.
ln Free Culture, Lessig declares that "a free culture is DOt a culture without
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property; it is DOt a culture in which artists don't get paid. A culture without
property, or in which creators can't get paid, is anarchy, DOt freedom.,,40 Of
course, the purpose of Creative Commons is DOt o assert that creators should DOt
be paid. However, the licenses do DOt provide for remuneration and one of their
collateral effects could weIl lead to a weakening of the position of artists in the
cultural environment. The copyright legislation of today too often leaves authors
without any legal protection against he economic pressures of intermediaries (e.g.,
publishers or producers). The emphasis that policy-makers increasingly place on
the economic interests of the copyright industry DOt only harms the users of
copyrighted works, but also prejudices the individual creators who will gradually
cease to see copyright as a right that exists to protect them.
The possible detrimental influence of Creative Commons artists is DOt merely
theoretical. Creative Commons could give considerable leeway to intermediaries to
abuse the system and to refuse to remunerate the creators. One example from my
own experience evoked during the Belgian launch event of the Creative Commons
licenses illustrates the potential for abuse of this system by intermediaries. An
important publicly-funded theatre in Belgium regularly pressures playwrights to
give up their copyright royalties, even though, in Belgium, such royalties amount to
only three percent of the income of the play! One may easily imagine that such a
theatre might be tempted to force the authors to submit their plays to a Creative
Commons regime. Even if the author registered ber work under a Creative
Commons license limited to non-commercial use, that term is DOt defmed. The
non-commerciallicenses only provide that the rights granted may DOt be exercised
"in any manDer that is primarily intended for or directed toward commercial
advantage or private monetary compensation.,,41 The vagueness of the term "non-
commercial" Taises difficult questions. For example, is a publicly-funded theatre
considered non-commercial? Is the staging of a play in such a theatre primarily
intended towards commercial advantage or private monetary compensation? Yet,
for many authors, particularly in countries that subsidize cultural institutions,
exploitation of their works by non-profit entities may constitute significant, or even
principal, sources ofremuneration.42
Creative Commons should be about a freely-consented gift from artists to
society and Dot about a gift compelled by political correctness. The consent of the
artist to give away ber works under a copyleft license should be real and informed
but should also be free from any social construction stating that artistic creation
I ,:r devoid of social1 
IJf copyright only
ily and culturally
40. Id. at xvi.
41. Article 4c of the Non-Commercial Creative Commons Licenses, http://creativecommons.org
(last visited Apr. Il,2006).
42. Should Creative Commons provide, even unintentionally, to the copyright and cultural
industries the means of depriving the creators of what they could gain from copyright protection, it
would certainly give the tools to the master to destroy, in bis bouse, what he did not \ike about it, what
made it impractical as a place for him to \ive, but made the bouse an important heritage that needed to be
preserved, and so on. Sometimes Creative Commons is keen to forget that the master in the copyright
bouse is more and more the copyright industry and that, as a master, it is commanding not only to
copyright users, but mainly to artists and original authors.
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should DOt be remunerated. The extent of the social pressure exerted on artists may
vary from one country to another. ln many countries, the status of artistic creation
is increasingly precarious, and the importance of culture and creation in policies or
public budgets is minimal. Public authorities tend to leave funding of culture to the
market. By having recourse to market tools to promote a free culture, Creative
Commons does DOt challenge this progressive relinquishment of creation to market
forces. Would DOt distribution of creative works under Creative Commons soon be
the default stance of any artist who knows that she should DOt expect much from
public funding (due to a decreased focus on culture) or from the private industry
(because ber work would DOt be mainstream or commercially promising)? The
narrative of the free gift to society could also Tender more invisible the work clone
by the artists, as it bas made invisible the work clone by housewives. These are
risks that Creative Commons should address by focusing its discourse a little more
on the artists themselves and on the economic and social conditions optimal for
culture and creation.43
Another possible detrimental effect of the ideology of Creative Commons
pertains to its focus on the needs of users who are DOt subsequent creators, but
merely consumers. It is important to recall that the Creative Commons vision of
copyright is DOt only about helping creators and industry to make derivative works,
but also about Dot considering end-users or consumers as felons when they access
or use copyrighted works. This entails a demand from the consumers that the
copyright DOt hinder their enjoymentof entertainment and culture.
It is surprising that the give-away of rights advocated by Creative Commons
would be rooted in the consumers' aspirations. 1 would be the flrst to say that
copyright should DOt treat end-us ers as pirates, a term that is dramatically and
wrongly overused. Similarly, 1 would criticize the increasing focus of copyright
enforcement on end-users; copyrightshould be about controlling the exploitation of
works, DOt their reception or private enjoyment.44 However, there is an equal risk
in advancing consumers' interests in order to impose a new norm of copyright on
artists and creators. ln my view, consumerism is as much a threat to copyright as
the increasing commodification of copyright (not surprisingly, since consumerism
is a by-product of increasing commodification in our modern society). Turning
copyrighted works into commodities bas recast the public as individual consumers,
and focusing on consumers makes explicit the recognition of a copyright regime
that considers creative works solely as commodities to be exchanged in a market.
Beyond Creative Commons, much of the contemporary discourse about copyright
Creative
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43. The launch ofCreative Commons Licenses in Belgium was followed by a two-day conference
about the copyleft movement's impact on artistic creation, which a non-profit association of artists
organized. One of the themes discussed was the labor economy in a Creative Commons societY, which
raised ail of these questions. See Jonctions/Verbindingen 8, http://www.constantvzw.com/cn_core/
vj8/dates.php?id=20041211 (last visited Feb. Il,2006).
44. SÉVERINE DUSOLLIER, DROIT D'AUTEUR ET PROTECTION DES OEUVRES DANS L'UNIVERS
NUMÉRIQUE -DROITS ET EXCEPTIONS A LA LUMIÉRE DES DISPOSITIFS DE VERROUILLAGE DES ŒUVRES
[COPYRiGHT AND PROTECTION OF WORKS lN THE DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT] 374-75 (Larcier, Brussels,
2005).
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Insumers that the
tends either to expand the protection of the copyright industry or to grant to
consumers more freedom of use of and access to copyrighted works, rather than to
address the protection of the author, on the one hand, and access by the public, on
the other. Literary and artistic property should address the protection of the
creators and enhance access to creation by the public; opposing the expectations of
the copyright industry to those of consumers is a debate that merely belongs to an
economy of commodities, rather than to the process of artistic creation.
By grounding its alternative regime for copyright in a consumerist ideology,
Creative Commons merely replicates the commoditized view of copyright. This
licensing system equates the consumers' demand for a better, and preferably free,
access to works with the desire of the copyright industry for better protection of
created works. Here again, one can say that using the master's tools cannot
dismantle the master' s bouse, as Creative Commons only wants to substitute the
copyright users, whether consumers or industry, to the copyright industry in the
raIe of the master.
1 think that Creative Commons is a meaningful initiative when it answers the
needs of creators. Creators who are benefited by Creative Commons may include
scientists who would like to share their knowledge with their peers, teachers who
want to put their teaching tools and modules at the disposaI of colleagues, non-
profit projects that want to spread the material they create and even artists who
want sharing, more than remuneration, to be a part of their creative process. ln
these creators' search for a way to formalize their desire to share and spread their
knowledge, information or creations, Creative Commons is a useful option. But the
change of social practice in copyright will not be achieved without an in-depth
consideration of the economy of culture and the conditions for artistic practices.
There is a risk that if Creative Commons does not start to reflect on the cultural
aspect of its ideology, it will harm artistic creation in a way that it bas not foreseen.
By assigning to creators the raIe that the consumers and some industries would like
them to assume, Creative Commons would play the game of such new masters in
copyright law.
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V. CONCLUSION
Creative Commons might DOt bring about the revolution that it claims to
advance. It is inventive when it deploys tools to empower authors to frame the
freedoms they want to give to those who use their works. Its inventiveness lies
precisely in its use of copyright methods to achieve this, rallier than in turning its
back on copyright law or relinquishing rights roto the public domain.
Nevertheless, by using the same tools that made copyright an increasingly
expansive and controversial monopoly over creative content, Creative Commons
might fail to shift the meaning and impact of copyright. "For master's tools will
never dismantle the master's house," wrote Audre Lorde, "They may allow us
temporarily to beat him at bis own game, butthey will never enable us to bring
j l",
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about genuine change.,,45 Relying on the private ordering scheme of property
rights and licensing contracts, Creative Commons does Dot operate differently than
some of the copyright industries that it repudiates. This reliance on private
ordering means results from an ambiguity that is at the COTe of the Creative
Commons project and might even reinforce the rampant commodification process
that is at work in copyright today. The licensing platform of Creative Commons
requires that the contract that gives free access to works be enforceable. Creative
Commons licenses provide that the mere use of a work implies consent o the terms
of the license. This rule, which also appears in free software licenses, makes the
contract indissociable from the product that it govems. Such a mode of contractuaI
agreement enhances the view of the work as a commodity by embedding the rules
goveming its exchange and use into the exchange and use of the work.
Further, Creative Commons' failure to fully take into account the social and
economic conditions of artistic creation may increase the commodification of
creation. By addressing the problem of copyright solely from the side of the users,
based on their needs and demands, Creative Commons tends to forget the author
and tends to leave the regulation of copyright to the market where creative works
are only considered as commodities. At its origin, copyright aims at regulating the
circulation of creative content in the public sphere by securing the right of the
author to such circulation and fostering public access to the works, as weIl as public
discussion and reuse ofworks.46 ln a consistent vein, some scholars have said that
copyright is about creating a social dialogue between the author and the public. 47
This object!ve can be discemed in the history of copyright Iaws. ln the eighteenth
century, which witnessed the birth of copyright legislation, the public sphere was
the place where authors and the public discussed new ideas and literary works.48
The emergence of a public sphere, which was also the seedbed for modem
democracy, prompted the development of copyright law. Thus, from its
beginnings, copyright law had a strong public dimension in the sense that the
public sphere paid significant attention to the interests of the public in accessing
works and in the necessary sharing of those works between their authors and the
public. Additionally, copyright law also dealt with the market because, under its
regime, creative works are partially turned into commodities that can be exchanged
in the marketplace; however, the main focus of copyright law concems the work
itself and its public dissemination, which goes far beyond what market transactions
can encompass (as the receptive or transformative uses allowed by fair use
demonstrate ). Certainly today, the market is of greater importance in copyright law
because copyright law is modified increasingly to take into account the economic
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45. LoRDE, supra note 4, at 112.
46. See generally DUSOLLŒR, supra note 44, at 220-39 (elaborating on the relationship between
copyright and the public sphere in the origin and evolution of copyright law).
47. Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Law and Social Dialogue on the Information Superhighway: l1Ie
Case Against Copyright Liability o/Bulletin Board Operators, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 345, 399
(1993).
48. See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCI1JRAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PuBLIC SPHERE: AN
INQUJR y INTO A CA TEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCŒTY (Thomas Burger trans., MIT Press 1991).
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interests of market players and to enable the subjection of any use of a work to a
market transaction. Therefore, the key objective of those who deplore the
economic shift that artistic property bas recently taken should be to replace the
social dialogue or the public sphere dimension of copyright at the core of its
regulation.
1 fear that Creative Commons only addresses one side of the dialogue: that of the
public opportunely transformed into consumers, while copyright industries address
the other side: that of the (corporate) copyright owners. It is mainly through legal
change, and through the parliamentary discussion that enactment of new laws
entails, that both sides can be taken into account and that the dialogue between the
author and the public can be restored. While other regulation methods such as
contracts or technology might help restore this balance, they should never be a
substitute for the law. 49
Should Creative Commons decline to consider the effect of its ideology and
strategy on the overall conditions of artistic creation, it cannot bring about the
revolution that it promises. To bring about real change for the better, thecopyleft
movements should flOt assume the impossibility of remunerating artistic work, the
invisibility of the creative process or the imposed logic of a gift for the sole profit
of users, whether it be the end-users or industry. Conversely, Creative Commons
and similar movements should ascribe equal value to the creation and the
enjoyment of works and should give more liberties and autonomy to the creators
and the public alike.
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PUBLIC SPHERE: AN 49. See Dusollier, supra note 44; see also Paul Goldstein, The Kastenmeier Lecture: Copyright
and Its Substitutes, 1997 WIS. L. REv. 865 (1997).
